Improving Outcomes for Children & Families through Performance Based Contracting - PBC

Presented by: Intermountain and YBGR

### Presentation Outline

- **#What is performance based contracting**
- **#Current PBC models**
- **\*\*Required Components**
- **™**Montana Pilot Project

# Performance Based Contracting Driven by State & Local Budget Issues

#Government budget deficits are driving the need to decrease government spending in health care and restructure role of government in health and human services

State budgets are changing the basic operating assumptions of provider organizations

**State Medicaid plans will be changing** 

What makes a contract "Performance Based?"

- #Provider reimbursement is linked to established outcomes and quality improvements
  - Results vs. Activities
  - Incentives/Reinvestment Funds
  - Flexibility
  - Monitoring and Measuring Performance

# How is PBC different from other contracting mechanisms

- # Focuses on outcomes (real results) rather than service delivery or process adherence
- # Introduces financial element into service provision in a more direct way
- Increases importance of data availability and quality for monitoring outcomes
- \*\* Not a panacea Just like anything else without extremely thoughtful and knowledgeable design, PBC can end up with a "bad result"

## States With PBC – We don't have to "recreate the wheel"

**#Connecticut** 

#Delaware

**#Florida** 

**#**Illinois

**Kansas** 

**\***Maine

**#**Missouri

■New York

**\*North Carolina** 

**#Pennsylvania** 

All have PBC experience in child welfare and mental health

### Startup – 2006

- □ Department of Children & Families Contract Agency
- □Goal is to serve youth in the least restrictive most effective setting
- □ Per diem rate based on behavioral acuity, not placement setting
- Original plan called for expectations to increase number of youth served and to measure long-term outcomes
- Child Protective Services stays with DCF

## #Principles of PBC

- Reward providers by returning state savings achieved through lower care day utilization
- Penalize providers who exceed care day expectations by having them reimburse the state share of excess days
- □ Tie portion of incentive/penalty to number of permanent exits and re-entries into care

- **\*\*Number of youth in State custody before** PBC was approximately 10,000
- #Number of youth in State custody since PBC is approximately 8,000
- #5,000 youth served per year with PBC
- **#PBC** in 5<sup>th</sup> year of implementation

### **\*\*PBC Goals**

△10% decrease in average care day utilization

△10% increase in permanent exits

△10% decrease in re-entry within one year

### **#PBC** Results

- Nearly 135,000 care days saved in the first 3 years (8% reduction)
- △167 more permanent exits than expected were achieved (6% increase)
- Re-entries remained virtually unchanged
- Accuracy of State data has improved

### **#**Structure

- Youth divided into populations based on

  - - Dependent/Neglect or Unruly 0-13, less than or more than 2 years in care, or at admission
    - Dependent/Neglect or Unruly 14+ in care, or at admission
    - Juvenile Delinquent in care, or at admission
    - Baseline expectations adjusted every 3 years

**XYouth** selected for PBC

No Sexual offenders allowed in PBC

### #Provider Selection

- △All PBC providers must be State licensed and nationally accredited
- Must provide full continuum of care
- □ Retrospective review is always a course of action for the State
- Providers retain right to deny services

#Provider Selection (cont.)

## Tennessee model - PBC

- **\*\*PBC Provider selection for the Child is based on** 
  - Scope of services
  - Demands and needs of the child
  - Geographic location sometimes a factor

- **#**Case/Treatment Planning & Utilization Review
  - State always has a case worker overseeing care
  - State has continual oversight and final say on changes in care
  - △ All UR is handled "in house" by provider along with a State case worker

### #First Year Startup

- 2 PBC providers selected
- all PBC providers had a hold harmless clause in contract
- △All were eligible to earn incentives
- Rotation used for year 1

\*\*Length of Service averages between 180 days at the lowest and 250 days at the highest

**Rates** based on 4 levels of functionality

### How Rates are paid

▼Tennessee Department of Children's Services pays for all case management and child welfare services with State GF

Medicaid pays for mental health/treatment services

#### REVENUE MODEL

- Average care day utilization incentive/penalty
- Exits to permanency adds 5% to 6% depending on rate of success
- Performance is evaluated semi-annually
- Incentives/penalties are calculated and paid annually
- Only State GF is used to pay Incentives

## **\*\*Provider/Program Model Revisions in Response to PBC**

- ☑Broader, more intensive family searches/focus on transition work with families
- Stronger focus on permanency in supervision and consultation processes
- Addition of new evidence-based interventions for this population

## **#Has PBC improved your services?**

- Dr. Tim Goldsmith, Youth Villages responded with:
  - "PBC has forced us to look at what we are doing instead of focusing on keeping the census up"

  - YC serves 3000 youth daily and over 16,000 youth annually.

### **Critical Competencies for Success in PBC**

- **BY DPHHS and qualified Montana providers must be able to demonstrate** 
  - Contracting Skills
  - Unit costing capability
  - Systems to measure and analyze data
  - Mechanisms to quickly address inability to meet performance standards
  - Leadership

### **#Defining Success**

Performance goals should reflect and reinforce the agency's broader system objectives

Performance goals must allow for discernment of the clinical treatment needs of a child versus only the incentive of discharge and permanency

## **#Defining Success (cont.)**

- Contracts should be designed to address specific system deficiencies or inefficiencies

#### **Selection of Performance Measures**

Performance indicators should be clearly measurable, fair and in the best interest of service recipient

Define baseline (current performance level) and set level of expected performance

#### **#Collaboration with Providers**

Involve providers in the establishment of performance indicators and reporting procedures

### **#Ensure capacity in Providers**

- Define provider qualifications and readiness
- Conduct feasibility study of current provider capacity

## **#Staff and Contractor Training**

- Define roles and responsibilities between private and public staff
- Require thorough training on processes and procedures in advance of implementation

## **#Internal Management Systems**

 △Thorough and ongoing review and updating of Administrative Rules, policies and procedures to ensure they support cost effective quality services

State of the art Information Technology and Data System are key to measuring and monitoring performance

## **#Effective Contract Monitoring**

- Consequences for not meeting standards must be thoughtfully considered during planning
- Agencies must have the ability to enforce the consequences if providers fail to meet contract requirements

### **X Time Limited Pilot Project Proposal**

- **∺** Contract agency: DPHHS
  - Child & Family Services Division
  - Children's Mental Health Bureau
  - Limited number of qualified providers
- **X** Identify Geographic Area
- **X** Youth must be in State Custody

## Montana Pilot for PBC – Next Steps

## **\*\* Work with Efficiencies in Government Committee** to:

- ■Begin outlining a potential plan and proposal
- **区**Establish timelines and objectives
- **Invite DPHHS staff to participate**
- Set up webinar sessions with public agency and provider experts from identified states

**#THANK YOU!** 

**#Questions**