12 Decoupling Is Not Perfect: Some Concerns Are Valid

There are many critics of decoupling, and many different issues that they criticize. Decoupling is not a perfect form of regulation — but neither is conventional regulation. Both seek to set prices for utility service that approximate the cost of providing that service. Both seek to provide incentives for management to take actions to reduce costs and to maximize profits.

In this section, we discuss some of the common critiques of decoupling mechanisms, recognizing that all forms of regulation involve compromise.

12.1 "It's an annual rate increase."

Some rate case participants view decoupling as an annual rate increase without a rate case. This may be the case if the use per customer is declining over time, but it does not provide any indication of whether customer energy bills are rising or falling. That may be due to utility programs and policies, or it may be due to other factors that can be taken into account in the design of the decoupling mechanism.

If the decline in usage per customer is due to utility programs and policies, an annual upward rate adjustment (which produces annual decreases in annual bills due to declining usage) may be exactly why the decoupling mechanism was created. If energy efficiency is less expensive than energy production, then customer energy bills are declining. Absent decoupling, the utility would likely be filing annual rate cases, creating a significant workload on the Commission and leading to similar rate increases, since the underlying causes are the same.

To the extent that less frequent rate cases produce fewer opportunities for consumers to present policy issues to the Commission, it is probably appropriate for the regulator to create an alternative forum for such policy review. One approach, for example, might be for the regulator to initiate a general rate case at least once every three to five years, to ensure that the allowed revenues under decoupling do not deviate too far from the utility's underlying costs.

12.2 "Decoupling adds cost."

This reflects a misunderstanding of decoupling. Decoupling increases the likelihood that the revenue requirement found appropriate in a rate case will be the amount actually collected from customers. Certain decoupling elements (e.g., adjustments for inflation, productivity, and numbers of customers) project how those approved costs might change, and allow these changes to be reflected in future collections; but these changes represent costs that are likely to be approved in a rate case, because they are essential to providing service. Decoupling itself adds no significant new costs; to the extent that decoupling reduces the frequency of general rate cases, it can significantly reduce regulatory costs.

12.3 "Decoupling shifts risks to consumers."

Full decoupling means that utility profits are no longer adversely affected by weather conditions that reduce sales volumes, and some critics consider this a shift of weather risk to consumers. This is a fundamentally flawed argument. First, decoupling also removes the profit enhancement that occurs under traditional regulation when weather conditions cause sales increases. Second, with current decoupling, although prices go up when sales go down, they do so simultaneously, so that customer bill volatility is reduced, a benefit to consumers attempting to live within a budget. In addition, when sales go up, prices come down, thereby mitigating the bill's impacts. In this sense, decoupling mitigates earnings risk for utilities and expense risk for consumers, making both better off — and in the process, it creates the earnings stability to justify a lower overall cost of capital, which reduces absolute costs to consumers.

12.4 "Decoupling diminishes the utility's incentive to control costs."

In fact, precisely the opposite is true. Decoupling does not guarantee utilities a level of earnings, only an assurance of a level of *revenue*. If the utility reduces costs, it increases earnings, just as it would under traditional regulation. Also, because the utility cannot increase profits by increasing sales, improved operational efficiency is the *only* means by which it can boost profits.

Because decoupling provides recovery of lost margin due to customer conservation efforts, however, it may extend the period between general rate cases. This is particularly true if aggressive utility conservation efforts are producing significant declines in customer usage; absent decoupling,

this sales decline will trigger rate cases. This longer time period provides a stronger incentive for the utility to achieve operational efficiencies and reduce costs, because the utility will be allowed to retain the cost savings for a longer time, until the next general rate case. If costs and revenues become unbalanced for any reason, the utility or the regulator can initiate a general rate case at any time.

12.5 "What utilities really want sales for is to have an excuse to add to rate base —that is, the Averch Johnson Effect."

In a rate case, the net-income line item in the cost of service is a function of the size of the rate base and the return allowed>>. The greater the rate base, the greater the net income that is included in the cost of service (for a given allowed return). Utilities may be motivated to increase sales in order to add to rate base capital assets needed to serve additional load, despite countervailing risks associated with permitting and construction, for instance. This is not a concern decoupling can address, nor is it intended to address. Rather, sound integrated resource planning that identifies the least-cost long-term resource acquisition strategy is the best way to manage incentives associated with the capital program.

12.6 "Decoupling violates the 'matching principle'."

The matching principle in ratemaking is an implicit assumption that revenues, sales, and costs will move in synchronization: as sales change (go either up or down), revenues and costs will change at the same rate. Absent changes in customers, programs, or policies, this has been generally effective in allowing traditional regulation to function effectively. Implied in the matching principle is that inflation is offset by productivity, and that new customers are about the same in terms of usage, revenue, and cost of service as existing customers. However, as discussed in the sections *How Traditional Regulation Works and How Decoupling Works,* it is the very fact that the matching principle does not hold true (that is, that marginal revenue almost always exceeds marginal cost in providing distribution service) that drives the need for decoupling.

Correspondingly, a change to a more comprehensive approach to energy efficiency means that deliberate programs and policies are implemented to achieve sales reductions for which there are no corresponding cost reductions, at least (for the most part) in distribution services. The very circumstances that counsel most regulators to consider decoupling — a desire to step up the rate of achievement of customer energy efficiency — directly undermine the foundation of the matching principle.

12.7 "Decoupling is not needed because energy efficiency is already encouraged, since it liberates power that can be sold to other utilities."

This condition does exist in some low-cost utilities that have excess capacity available for sale and that do not have FACs. Any utility with a traditional FAC does not benefit from off-system sales, because those revenues are credited to their retail consumers through the adjustment clause.

This concern, however, overlooks the temporary nature of excess capacity, especially if some of it is the result of an aging generation approaching retirement, and the changing nature of power markets. Decoupling encourages utilities to take actions that may increase off-system sales revenues, but only if power costs are covered by a decoupling mechanism will those sales result in increased profits for the companies.

Lastly, off-system sales have less certainty and are subject to the vagaries of market prices, whereas sales to native loads are more certain and subject to less price volatility. Conservative utility managers are likely to prefer the "bird in hand" in such cases.

12.8 "Decoupling has been tried and abandoned in Maine and Washington."

Maine and Washington initiated decoupling mechanisms in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and both terminated the programs after a few years. The reasons for termination were different.

In Maine, the decoupling mechanism was instituted for Central Maine Power shortly before a serious recession hit the country. Sales declined and the decoupling mechanism generated significant rate increases, because of the large annual adjustment resulting from the use of an accrual methodology. The Commission elected to discontinue the mechanism. Of course, for the most part, decoupling only implemented what a new rate case would have yielded in any event, the root cause of the problem not being the mode of regulation, but the recession. The lesson learned is that a cap on annual rate increases may be appropriate, and a complete review of costs, sales, and revenues (i.e., a general rate case or equivalent) should be required every few years under a decoupling mechanism.

In Washington, a decoupling mechanism applied to "base costs" was introduced at the same time that a separate mechanism was introduced to recover "power costs." The utility (Puget Sound Power and Light Company) was acquiring significant new resources to replace expiring power supply contracts. Rates went up sharply due to the operation of the power cost mechanism, not the decoupling mechanism. The increases raised public

concerns, and the public utility commission (PUC) opened an inquiry into the Puget's resource decisions. The Commission found that, with respect to certain power supply contracts, the utility had acted imprudently. The combined mechanism was terminated. The rate adjustments due to the decoupling portion had been minor, and were not the primary focus of the Commission's inquiry. Shortly thereafter, Puget applied for a merger with Washington Natural Gas Company. A multi-year rate plan was approved as part of the merger, displacing both the power-cost and base-cost decoupling mechanisms.

12.9 "Classes that are not decoupled should not share the cost of capital benefits of decoupling."

Many commissions have excluded large-volume electricity and natural gas consumers from decoupling mechanisms. The reason for this is that classes of customers with few members may really require customer-specific attention in ratemaking, and a decoupling mechanism could result in significant rate increases to remaining customers if another customer or customers in the class discontinued or reduced operations.

Because decoupling results in a lower risk profile for the utility, particularly with respect to weather and economic cycles, it is expected (either immediately or over time) that a reduction in the cost of capital will result. A class that is not exposed to decoupling rate adjustments due to sales variations is not a part of the cause of the lower risk profile. However, because Commissions normally apply the same rate of return to all classes, it may not be pragmatic to calculate a different rate of return for each class.

As a practical matter, large-use customer classes often have other revenue stabilization elements in their rates, such as contract demand levels, demand ratchets, and straight fixed/variable rate designs that have a stabilizing effect on revenues similar to that of decoupling. Consequently, one might argue that, under traditional regulation, the classes with more variable loads were benefiting from the risk-reducing nature of larger-volume customers, and that decoupling merely balances the scales.[35]

35 But it is fairer to say that all loads impose both risks and benefits on the utility. A large-volume user may have a higher-than-average load factor and provide stable revenues to the utility, but the adverse impacts of its leaving the system are significantly greater than those of individual lower-volume customers. Many factors affect the market's valuation of the risks that a utility faces; load diversity is only one of them.

12.10 "The use of frequent rates cases using a future test year eliminates the need for decoupling."

A future test year may have the effect of causing a utility's "revenue requirement" to more closely track a utility's revenue requirement over time. A future test year does not, however, have the effect of constraining *allowed revenues* to a utility's revenue requirement. In addition, a future test year does not address the throughput issue, which is one of the primary reasons for using decoupling. The term "decoupling" itself is rooted in the notion of separating the utility's incentive to increase profits through increased sales, and to avoid decreased profits through decreased sales by breaking the link between — that is, by decoupling revenues from sales.

12.11 "Decoupling diminishes the utility's incentive to restore service after a storm."

This can be a problem if not addressed in the design of the decoupling mechanism. After a storm, utilities normally bring in extra crews, pay overtime, airlift in supplies, and otherwise do everything reasonably possible to restore service. The primary reasons for this are the deeply-held sense of obligation that drives utilities and their employees to provide reliable service and their appreciation of the far-reaching and deleterious impacts of an outage.

But there is also a more prosaic motive: the need to "get the cash register running" again, so revenue flows to the utility. If a decoupling mechanism allows the utility to receive the revenues that it would have collected if the power were on, consumers both suffer an outage and pay for service they did not receive. The utility is made whole, and really does not suffer any penalty from slow service restoration.

This is easily addressed in the design of an RPC decoupling mechanism. One approach would be to adjust the number of customers for whom the allowed revenue is computed to reflect only those who were receiving service during a particular time period, deducting days when power was unavailable. (This same concern applies equally to straight fixed/variable pricing: the charges to consumers must be halted during an outage, or the incentive to restore service is diminished.) Another approach would be to address service quality issues such as outages separately, in a comprehensive Service Quality Index, with penalties tied to outage frequency and duration.

12.12 "The problem is that utility profits don't reward utility performance."

At least two states have tried to overcome utility resistance to energy efficiency investment by allowing a higher rate of return for investment in energy efficiency than utilities receive on supply-side investments. While this can work in theory, it is difficult to make it work in practice, because the incentive return must be quite high to overcome the lost margin effect that decoupling addresses. In addition, a premium return may tend to reinforce the Averch-Johnson effect, giving utilities an incentive to spend as much as possible (to attract the incentive return) on measures that save little or no energy (to avoid creating lost margins). An incentive return mechanism can be a very important part of regulation, for example, by tying the utility's return (or the utility's recovery of deferral margins under decoupling) to the utility's achievement of energy efficiency achievement and cost control targets approved by the commission. But, as a general matter, incentive return mechanisms have not been effective alternatives to decoupling; in combination *with* decoupling, however, they can be.